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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
GEORGE AUGUSTUS KEE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20020272-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in convicting Kee without affording him a trial by 
jury after he had made the request for such in writing at least 10 days before the trial 
date pursuant to Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal procedure, and having never 
waived said right as required by Utah Code Annotated § 77-1 -6(e). This issue presents 
a question of law that is reviewed non-deferentially by this Court for correctness. Salt 
Lake City v. Roseto, 2002 UT App 66, f7, 44 P.3d 835. Kee asserts that this issue was 
preserved with his written demand for a jury trial (R. 18). Alternatively, this Court 
should review this issue under a plain error standard. This Court reviews claims of 
plain error for obvious and prejudicial error. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121-22 
(Utah 1989). 
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CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All relevant statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
George Agustus Kee appeals from the conviction in the Third District Court of 
Battery, a Class B Misdemeanor and Disturbing the Peace, an infraction and sentencing 
him to a term of 180 days in the Salt Lake County Jail suspended except for 15 days 
and probation for one year, supervised by Adult Probation and Parole. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
George Agustus Kee was charged by information filed in Third District Court on 
or about February 1, 2001, with: Battery, a Class B Misdemeanor; and Disturbing the 
Peace, an infraction (R. 1). 
On June 18, 2001, at a pre-trial conference, counsel was appointed for Kee and 
on July 3, 2001 a written demand for trial by jury was filed (R. 17, 18). On September 
5, 2001 a jury trial was scheduled for October 26, 2001 (R. 27). Kee failed to appear 
for the trial on that date and a warrant issued on October 26, 2001 for his failure to 
appear (R. 28). The warrant was subsequently recalled and a Pre-trial was set for 
January 2, 2002 during which the City requested a bench trial date which was set for 
February 28, 2002, without input or a waiver from Kee or his counsel on the record 
(1/2/02 Tr. at 2). On February 28, 2002, a bench trial was held after which Kee was 
found guilty of both charges and a sentencing date set for April 29, 2002 (R. 56 at 16). 
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Sentencing was held on April 29, 2002, where Kee was sentenced to 180 days in the 
Salt Lake County Jail, suspended and placed on probation with Adult Probation and 
Parole for 12 months (R. 57 at 4). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On or about February 1, 2001, Kee was charged by information in Third District 
Court with one count of Battery, a class B misdemeanor and one count of Disturbing 
the Peace, an infraction (R. 1). On June 18, 2001, counsel was appointed for Kee and 
a Pre-trial date set (R. 17). An Appearance of Counsel and Demand for Trial by Jury 
was filed by Kee's counsel on July 2, 2001 (R. 18). On September 5, 2001, Kee 
appeared with counsel and a Jury Trial date was set for October 26, 2001 (R. 27). In a 
minute entry signed and dated October 30, 2001 an arrest warrant was issued for Kee 
for his failure to appear for Jury Trial on October 26, 2001 (R. 28). At a pre-trial 
conference on January 2, 2002 a bench trial date was set pursuant to the request of the 
City without any apparent input by Kee or defense counsel and no waiver of the 
previous written demand for Jury Trial (1/2/02 Tr. at 2). 
On February 28, 2002, before the Honorable Robin W. Reese, a bench trial was 
held, during which two witnesses for the City and none for the defense testified. The 
two witnesses for the City gave the testimony that Kee came to the University Pet 
Clinic with an ill cat (R. 56 at 2, 10). They both testified that Kee became somewhat 
upset about a question on a form he was asked to complete and that the first witness left 
the room to get the office manager (R. 56 at 2, 11-12). The first witness testified that 
although she was not present in the room, that after the office manager went to speak 
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with Kee she heard the office manager "scream a little bit" and then fly in front of the 
window (R. 56 at 4, 9). She also testified that she spoke to the office manager after 
and that she appeared nervous, very scared, stuttering, stammering, breathing fast, and 
frustrated, with surprise in her voice but not yelling or screaming (R. 56 at 6). She 
farther testified that the office manager said "I can't believe what's just happened to 
me. That guy, that guy just grabbed me. Look at my arm" (R. 56 at 6-8). Defense 
counsel objected to said statements as hearsay, which the trial court overruled as an 
exception to hearsay as an excited utterance (R. 56 at 7). This first witness also 
testified of a mark she saw upon the office manager's arm as looking like a red thumb 
print impression (R. 56 at 8). 
The second witness stated that the office manager spoke to Kee who grabbed her 
by her forearms and flung her and while being very loud (R. 56 at 13, 14). This 
second witness also testified to seeing a mark on the office manager's arm (R. 56 at 
15). The City then rested and so did defense counsel without presenting any evidence 
or making any arguments (R. 56 at 15). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Kee asserts that he was denied his constitutional and statutory right to a jury trial 
when the trial court erred in setting a bench trial without any apparent evidence to 
determine that Kee had waived his previous written demand for a jury trial. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING KEE 
WITHOUT AFFORDING HEM A TRIAL BY JURY AFTER HE HAD 
MADE THE REQUEST FOR SUCH IN WRITING AT LEAST 10 DAYS 
BEFORE THE TRIAL DATE, PURSUANT TO RULE 17(d) OF THE 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, AND HAVING 
NEVER WAIVED SAID RIGHT AS REQUIRED BY 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 77-l-6(e). 
It has long been held that the right to a jury trial is a fundamental constitutional 
right. U.S. Const. Amend. VI; Utah Const. Art. I, § 10; see generally Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968); Mel Hardman 
Productions, Inc. V. Robinson, 604 P.2d 913 (Utah 1979); State v. James, 30 Utah 2d 
32, 512 P.2d 1031 (1973); Flynn v. W.P. Harlin Constr. Co., 29 Utah 2d 327, 509 
P.2d 356 (1973). The right to trial by an impartial jury is also guaranteed statutorily. 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-1-6 provides: 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(f) to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district where the 
offense is alleged to have been committed; 
(2) In addition: 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a plea of 
guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by jury has been 
waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a magistrate. 
To invoke the rights guaranteed by this section, a defendant charged with a 
misdemeanor must comply with Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
which requires that: 
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a jury in 
open court with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution. 
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(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes a 
written demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders otherwise. No 
jury shall be allowed in the trial of an infraction. 
Utah R.Crim.P. 17(c)-(d). 
In Salt Lake City v. Roseto, 2002 UT App 66, 111, 44 P.3d 835, this Court held 
that in order to determine whether a defendant is entitled to a jury trial "the trial court 
need only determine (1) that the defendant is charged with a crime other than an 
infraction; (2) that the defendant has complied with Rule 17(d) by making a written 
demand for a jury trial; and (3) that the defendant has not waived the right to a jury 
trial." This Court derived its decision in Roseto based on the plain language of Utah 
Code Annotated § 77-l-6(2)(e) and Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. Roseto, 2002 UT App 66 at J8. 
In the case at hand Kee should have been entitled to a jury trial. First, he was 
charged with a misdemeanor, which is a crime other than an infraction (R. 1). 
Second, he complied with Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure when 
the written demand for jury trial was filed on July 2, 2001 (R. 18). Kee asserts that 
this right to a jury trial under these circumstances should have been obvious to the trial 
court based upon the plain and unambiguous language of both § 77-1-6 and Rule 17(d). 
Moreover, there is nothing in the record to show that Kee's right to a jury trial 
was waived by him as required by Roseto. In State v. Moosman, the Utah Supreme 
Court found that in a felony matter because no waiver of a jury was ever made by 
defendant in open court or on the record, that such waiver would not be presumed from 
a silent record because "[a] criminal defendant's right to a jury trial is substantial and 
valuable and should be carefully safeguarded by our courts." 794 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah 
1990) (citing State v. Cook 714 P.2d 296, 297-298 (Utah 1986) (citing Utah Const. 
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Art. I, § 12; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157-58, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 1451-52, 20 
L.Ed.2d 491 (1968); State v. Studham, 655 P.2d 669, 671 (1982))). 
In the case at hand, like the defendants in Moosman and Roseto, there is also 
nothing in the record to show that defendant's right to a jury trial was ever waived. A 
written demand for jury trial had been made and there is no apparent evidence on the 
record that said demand was ever waived. Instead, after the first jury trial date had 
passed, (R. 28) the City was the sole party that made a request for a bench trial date, 
which the trial court granted with no apparent input or waiver by the defendant (1-2-02 
Tr. at 2). 
Because Kee had already complied with Rule 17(d) in making a written demand 
for jury trial, he asserts that the trial court was obligated by statute and case-law to 
ensure that the case proceeded to a jury or that an effective waiver was determined to 
have been made by the trial court; and that it was error for the trial court to hold and 
convict him in a bench trial without first obtaining such a waiver. See, e.g., State v. 
Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201 (Utah App. 1992) (trial judges have duty to safeguard 
accused's constitutional right to impartial jury); State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 
(Utah 1987) (Rule 11(e) "squarely places on trial court's the burden of ensuring" that 
the constitutional and procedural requirements are met); State v. Zavala-Perez, 2002 
UT App 390 (conviction reversed on joint motion for summary reversal based on trial 
court's holding that defendant waived right to jury trial by failing to maintain contact 
with appointed counsel). 
Furthermore, Utah Code Annotated § 77-1-6(2)(e) states that "No person shall 
be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no contest, or upon 
a judgment of a court when trial by jury has been waived . . . " Should this Court 
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conclude that this issue was not preserved, Kee asserts that the plain and unambiguous 
language of this section-and the statutory requirement in this case that the right to a 
jury be waived prior to trial before the bench-should have been obvious to the trial 
court and that without such a waiver Kee should not have been tried by the trial court. 
Additionally, the third prong identified by this Court in Roseto as essential in 
determining a defendant's right to a jury trial is a determination "that the defendant has 
not waived the right to a jury trial." State v. Roseto, 44 P.3d at 837. There appears to 
be nothing in the record to support any finding or determination, let alone any finding 
or determination that Kee waived his right to a jury trial. 
Kee also asserts that the prejudiced he suffered because of the obvious violation 
by the trial court of denying him his right to a jury trial should, like with Rule 11 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, be presumed. State v. Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, H 
25-26, 996 P.2d 1065, aff'dby 2001 UT 68, 31 P.3d 528; State v. Tarnawiecki, 2000 
UT app 186, 118, 5 P.3d 1222. Nothing is more fundamental to the American system 
of justice and due process than the right to a trial by an impartial jury. Kee asserts that 
the trial court's deprivation of his right to a jury trial denied him fundamental 
constitutional and statutory protections and that this Court should accordingly reverse 
his convictions and order that the matter be remanded to the Third District for a jury 
trial on these charges. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Kee asks that this Court find that the obvious and 
harmful error of the trial court in depriving him of his right to a jury trial requires 
reversal of his convictions. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of May, 2003. 
Patrick V. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief Of Appellant to Simarjit Gill, Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office, 349 South 200 
East, Suite 500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 this 12th day of May, 2003. 
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
MBLE 
le 
I. Declaration of Rights 
I. State Boundaries 
I. Ordinance 
V. Elections and Right of Suffrage 
V. Distribution of Powers 
I . Legislative Department 
I. Executive Department 
I. Judicial Department 
C. Congressional and Legislative Apportionment 
C. Education 
I. Local Governments 
I. Corporations 
I. Revenue and Taxation 
V. Public Debt 
V. Militia 
I. Labor 
I. Water Rights 
I. Forestry 
L Public Buildings and State Institutions 
L Public Lands 
I. Salaries 
I. Miscellaneous 
[. Amendment and Revision 
1. Schedule 
PREAMBLE 
eful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we, the people 
i, in order to secure and perpetuate the principles of 
vernment, do ordain and establish this CONSTITU-
1896 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
berent and inalienable rights.] 
I political power inherent in the people.] 
ah inseparable from the Union.] 
ligious liberty] 
ibeas corpus.] 
jht to bear arms.] 
e process of law.] 
enses bailable.] 
cessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.] 
al by jury.] 
ir ts open — Redress of injuries.] 
rhts of accused persons.] 
•secution by information or indictment — Grand jury.] 
reasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of war-
rant.] 
edom of speech and of the press — Libel.] 
imprisonment for debt — Exception ] 
ctions to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
ainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing contracts.] 
ason defined — Proof.] 
itary subordinate to the civil power.] 
very forbidden ] 
fate property for public use.] 
vocable franchises forbidden.] 
T A T » T V 1 A T \ A * » r t $-% rtT» A t I A T T T D 1 
l u x u i u p c i a u u i i UA iawc5 j 
tits retained by people.] 
visions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
Section 
27. [Fundamental rights.] 
28. Peclara t ion of the rights of crime victims.] 
Sect ion 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjov and 
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect 
property; to worship according to the dictates of their con-
sciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and 
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their 
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of tha t 
right. 1896 
Sec. 2. [All political power inherent in the people . ] 
All political power is inherent m the people; and all free 
governments are founded on their authority for their equal 
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or 
reform their government as the public welfare may require. 
1896 
Sec. 3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
The State of Utah is an inseparable part of the Federal 
Union and the Constitution of the United States is the 
supreme law of the land. 1896 
Sec. 4. [Religious liberty.] 
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test shall be 
required as a qualification for any office of public trust or for 
any vote at any election; nor shall any person be incompetent 
as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the 
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church and State, 
nor shall any church dominate the State or interfere with its 
functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated 
for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, 
or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. 1999 
Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.] 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless, m case of rebellion or invasion, the public 
safety requires it. 1896 
Sec. 6. [Right t o bear a rms . ] 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for 
security and defense of self, family, others, property, or the 
state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be 
infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature 
from defining the lawful use of arms 1984 (2nd S.S.) 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
without due process of law. 
Sec . 8. [Offenses bailable.] 
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable 
except* 
(a) persons charged with a capital offense when there is 
substantial evidence to support the charge; or 
(b) persons charged with a felony while on probation or 
parole, or while free on bail awaiting trial on a previous 
felony charge, when there is substantial evidence to 
support the new felony charge; or 
(c) persons charged with any other crime, designated 
by statute as one for which bail may be denied, if there is 
suustajiticU eviuence to support tue charge anu. tue court 
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person 
would constitute a substantial danger to any other person 
or property, 
1896 
Art. I, § 9 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 720 
or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of 
the court if released on bail. 
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal 
only as prescribed by law. 1988 (2nd S.S.) 
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punish-
ments.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not 
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be 
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated 
with unnecessary rigor. 1896 
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate. In capital cases the jury shall consist of twelve 
persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of 
no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature 
shall establish the number of jurors by statute, bu t in no event 
shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal 
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-
fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases 
shall be waived unless demanded. 1996 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is 
a party. 1896 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or 
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, 
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any 
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to ad-
vance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. 
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of that exammation is limited to 
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall pre-
clude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as denned by statute 
or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with 
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by statute or rule. 1994 
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — 
Grand jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indict-
ment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination 
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be 
waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by 
indictment, with or without such examination and commit-
ment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and 
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issu-
ance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 
of shall not be violated; and no warran t shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
l describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to 
>.) be seized. 1896 
*" Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of 
^ speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the 
^ t ru th may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall 
appear to the jury tha t the mat ter charged as libelous is true, 
* and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, 
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right 
 to determine the law and the fact. 1896 
' 
£ Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.] 
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of 
Lj. absconding debtors. 1896 
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or military, 
shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the 
right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time of war, may vote at their 
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be 
prescribed by law. 1896 
^ Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing 
e contracts.] 
a No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the 
s obligation of contracts shall be passed. 1896 
g
Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war 
D against it, or in adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid 
5 and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on 
y the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act. 1896 
3 
I Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.] 
l The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil 
r power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered in 
any house without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war 
j except in a manner to be prescribed by law. 1896 
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
'. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as, a 
punishment for crime, whereof the par ty shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within this State. 1896 
Sec. 22. [Private property for publ ic use.] 
7
 Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
}
 use without just compensation. 1896 
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
i No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise, 
) privilege or immunity. 1896 
L 
; Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
[ All laws of a general na ture shall have uniform operation. 
1896 
Sec. 25. [Rights retained by people.] 
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair 
i or deny others retained by the people. 1896 
Sec. 26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and 
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be 
otherwise. 1896 
Sec. 27. [Fundamental rights.] 
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential 
to the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free 
government. 1896 
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lection 
7.I.5. Prosecuting party. 
7.I-6. Rights of defendant. 
7.I.7. Dismissal without trial — Custody or discharge of 
defendant. 
7-1.1. Short title. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Code 
"Criminal Procedure." 1980 
M-2. Criminal procedure prescribed. 
The procedure in criminal cases shall be as prescribed in 
ds title, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and such further 
lies as may be adopted by the Supreme Court of Utah, i960 
M-3. Definitions. 
For the purpose of this act: 
(1) "Criminal action* means the proceedings by which a 
person is charged, accused, and brought to trial for a 
public offense. 
(2) "Indictment" means an accusation in writing pre-
sented by a grand jury to the district court charging a 
person with a public offense. 
(3) "Information" means an accusation, in writing, 
charging a person with a public offense which is pre-
sented, signed, and filed in the office of the clerk where the 
prosecution is commenced pursuant to Section 77-2-1.1. 
(4) "Magistrate" means a justice or judge of a court of 
record or not of record or a commissioner of such a court 
appointed in accordance with Section 78-3-31, except that 
the authority of a court commissioner to act as a magis-
trate shall be limited by rule of the judicial council. The 
judicial council rules shall not exceed constitutional limi-
tations upon the delegation of judicial authority. 1995 
1-4. Conviction to precede punishment. 
•Jo person shall be punished for a public offense until 
ivicted in a court having jurisdiction. 1980 
1-5. Prosecut ing party. 
i criminal action for any violation of a state statute shall be 
secuted in the name of the state of Utah. A criminal action 
violation of any county or municipal ordinance shall be 
secuted in the name of the governmental entity involved. 
1980 
1-6. Rights of defendant. 
L) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by 
counsel; 
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him; 
(c) Tb testify in his own behalf; 
(d) lb be confronted by the witnesses against him; 
(e) Tb have compulsory process to insure the atten-
dance of witnesses in his behalf; 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the 
county or district where the offense is alleged to have been 
committed; 
(g) Tb the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) lb be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions 
of law, or be entitled to a trial within 30 days after 
arraignment if unable to post bail and if the business of 
the court permits. 
) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the 
same offense; 
Ob) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be 
compelled to advance money or fees to secure rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution or the laws of Utah, or to 
pay the costs of those rights when received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence 
against himself; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband nor a husband against his wife; and 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a 
jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a 
judgment of a court when trial by jury has been waived or, 
in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a magistrate. 
1980 
77-1-7. Dismissal without trial — Custody or discharge 
of defendant. 
(1) (a) Further prosecution for an offense is not barred if 
the court dismisses an information or indictment based on 
the ground: 
(i) there was unreasonable delay; 
(ii) the court is without jurisdiction; 
(iii) the offense was not properly alleged in the 
information or indictment; or 
(iv) there was a defect in the impaneling or the 
proceedings relating to the grand jury. 
(b) The court may make orders regarding custody of 
the defendant pending the filing of new charges as the 
interest of justice may require. Otherwise, the defendant 
shall be discharged and bail exonerated. 
(2) An order of dismissal based upon unconstitutional delay 
in bringing the defendant to trial or upon the statute of 
limitations is a bar to any other prosecution for the offense 
charged. 1990 
CHAPTER l a 
PEACE OFFICER DESIGNATION [RENUMBERED] 
77-la- l to 77-la-10. Renumbered as §§ 53-13-102 to 
53-13-110. 1998 
CHAPTER 2 
PROSECUTION, SCREENING AND DIVERSION 
Section 
77-2-1. Authorization to file information. 
77-2-1.1. Signing and filing of information. 
77-2-2. Definitions. 
77-2-3. Termination of investigative action. 
77-2-4. Dismissal of prosecution. 
77-2-4.5. Dismissal by compromise — Limitations. 
77-2-5. Diversion agreement — Negotiation — Contents. 
77-2-6. Dismissal after compliance with diversion agree-
ment. 
77-2-7. Diversion not a conviction. 
77-2-8. Violation of diversion agreement — Hearing — 
Prosecution resumed. 
77-2-9. Offenses ineligible for diversion. 
77-2-1. Authorization to file information. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, no information may be 
filed charging the commission of any felony or class A misde-
meanor unless authorized by a prosecuting attorney. 1980 
77-2-1.1. Signing and filing of information. 
The prosecuting attorney shall sign all informations. The 
prosecuting attorney may: 
(1) sign the information in the presence of a magis-
trate; or 
(2) present and file the information in the office of the 
clerk where the prosecution is commenced upon the 
signature of the prosecuting attorney. 1992 
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for failure to comply with discovery require-
ments, 9 A.L.R.4th 837. 
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or disclosure of tape recording of his own state-
ments, 10 A.L.R.4th 1092. 
Necessity or permissibility of mental exami-
nation to deteraiine competency or credibility 
of complainant in sexual offense prosecution, 
45 A.L.R.4th 310. 
What is accused's "statement" subject to state 
court criminal discovery, 57 A.L.R.4th 827. 
Criminal law: dog scent chscrimination line-
ups, 63 A.L.R.4th 143. 
Right of defendant in criminal contempt pro-
ceeding to obtain information by deposition, 33 
A.L.R.5th 761. 
Illegal drugs or narcotics involved in alleged 
. offense as subject to discovery by defendant 
under Rule 16 of Federal Rules of Criminal 
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17. The trial. 
i all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in 
and by counsel. The defendant shall be personally present at the trial 
e following exceptions: 
In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may 
• in writing to trial in his absence; 
In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's 
ry absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for trial 
)t prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered 
shall have the same effect as if defendant had been present; and 
The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial for good cause 
tfhich may include tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous conduct. 
application of the prosecution, the court may require the personal 
nee of the defendant at the trial, 
ases shall be set on the trial calendar to be tried in the following order: 
misdemeanor cases when defendant is in custody; 
felony cases when defendant is in custody; 
felony cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance; and 
misdemeanor cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance. 
1 felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a jury 
court with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution. 
1 other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes 
demand a t least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders otherwise, 
shall be allowed in the trial of an infraction. 
all cases, the number of members of a trial jury shall be as specified 
>n 78-46-5, U.C.A. 1953. 
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(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may, with the consent of the 
accused and the approval of the court, by stipulation in writing or made orallv 
in open court, proceed to trial or complete a trial then in progress with anv 
number of jurors less than otherwise required. 
(g) After the jury has been impaneled and sworn, the trial shall proceed m 
the following order: 
(g)(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated; 
(g)(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening statement and the 
defense may make an opening statement or reserve it until the prosecution has 
rested; 
(g)(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the charge; 
(g)(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may present its case* 
(g)(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the 
court, for good cause, otherwise permits; 
(g)(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate time 
the court shall instruct the jury; and 
(g)(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side or on both! 
sides without argument, the prosecution shall open the argument, the defensi 
shall follow and the prosecution may close by responding to the defense^  
argument. The court may set reasonable limits upon the argument of counsel 
for each party and the time to be allowed for argument. I 
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified during trial and an 
alternate juror has been selected, the case shall proceed using the alte3rnate 
juror. If no alternate has been selected, the parties may stipulate to proceed 
with the number of jurors remaining. Otherwise, the jury shall be discharged 
and a new trial ordered. j 
(i) Questions by jurors. A judge may invite jurors to submit written ques' 
tions to a witness as provided in this section. j 
(i)(l) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge shall control 
the process to ensure the jury maintains its role as the impartial finder of fac 
and does not become an investigative body. The judge may disallow am 
question from a juror and may discontinue questions from jurors at any time 
(i)(2) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge shod! 
advise the jurors that they may write the question as it occurs to them an! 
submit the question to the bailiff for transmittal to the judge. The judge shoul 
advise the jurors that some questions might not be allowed. 
(i)(3) The judge shall review the question with counsel and unrepresente 
parties and rule upon any objection to the question. The judge may disallow1 
question even though no objection is made. The judge shall preserve tU 
written question in the court file. If the question is allowed, the judge shall as 
the question or permit counsel or an unrepresented party to ask it. Tr 
question may be rephrased into proper form. The judge shall allow counsel an 
unrepresented parties to examine the witness after the juror's question, j 
(j) When m the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to view the pla< 
in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, or in which any oth< 
material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body under tl 
charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by some pers< 
appomted by the court for that purpose. The officer shall be sworn that wb 
the jury are thus conducted, he will suffer no person other than the person 
appointed to speak to them nor to do so himself on any subject connected wi 
the trial and to return them into court without unnecessary delay or at 
specified time. 
(k) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are permitted to separs 
or are sequestered, they shall be admonished by the court that it is their di 
not to converse among themselves or to converse with, or suffer themselves 
be addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is tn 
duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is fi113 
submitted to them. 
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Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the lnstruc-
of the court and all exhibits which have been received as evidence, except 
nts that should not, m the opimon of the court, be m the possession of the 
such as exhibits of unusual size, weapons or contraband. The court shall 
it the jury to view exhibits upon request. Jurors are entitled to take notes 
Lg the trial and to have those notes with them during deliberations. As 
;sary, the court shall provide jurors with writing materials and instruct 
iry on taking and using notes. 
) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall be kept 
her in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they agree 
a verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Except 
der of the court, the officer having them under his charge shall not allow 
ommunication to be made to them, or make any himself, except to ask 
if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he shall not, before the verdict 
Ldered, communicate to any person the state of their deliberations or the 
ct agreed upon. 
After the jury: has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed 
y point of law arising in the cause, they shall inform the officer in charge 
m, who shall communicate such request to the court. The court may then 
that the jury be brought before the court where, in the presence of the 
dant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry or advise the 
that no farther instructions shall be given. Such response shall be 
led. The court may in its discretion respond to the inquiry in writing 
ut having the jury brought before the court, in which case the inquiry and 
>sponse thereto shall be entered in the record. 
If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on its face, it may be 
•ted by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may be sent out 
At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion 
the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any information or 
ment, or any count thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not 
y sufficient to establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included 
e. 
ided effective November 1, 2001; November 1, 2002.) 
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BRENDA VIERA (#8820) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
-v-
GEORGE KEE, 
Defendant. 
APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL 
AND DEMAND FOR TRIAL 
BY JURY 
CaseNo.011901792MC 
JUDGE BARRETT 
BRENDA VIERA, on appointment of the above-entitled Court, herewith enters an 
Appearance of Counsel of record and demands a trial by jury in the above-entitled case. 
DATED this8£\ day of June, 2001. 
BRENDA VIERA 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Appearance of Counsel to the Salt 
Lake City Prosecutor's Office, 451 South Second East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this^_L day 
of June, 2001. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE CITY 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-oOo-
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GEORGE AGUSTUS KEE, 
Defendant. 
Case No.011901792 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE 
(Videotape Proceedings) 
-oOo-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 2nd day of 
January, 2002, commencing at the hour of 3:40 p.m., the 
above-entitled matter came on for laiearing before the 
HONORABLE ROBIN W- REESE, sitting as Judge in the above-
named Court for the purpose of this: cause, and that the 
following videotape proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the City: 
For the Defendant: 
3«DO&oaL"id-c^ 
PAUL A- CURTIS 
Salt LaBce City Prosecutor's 
Of If ice 
349 South 200 East, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
WESLEY J. HOWARD 
Attorney at Law 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
FEB 19 2003 
f j SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Byw 
iteputy uerK 
A D i r i M A I 
ALAN P SMITH, C$R 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 256^3 2 0 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84107 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
MR. CURTIS: The matter of George Kee, please. 
THE COURT: George Kee, yes. I'll call that matter 
next. 
MR. CURTIS: Your Honor, could we have a date for a 
bench trial, please? 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
It'll be that date, I believe it's the 28th of 
February, that's right, at 2:00 o'clock. 
THE CLERK: What type of hearing? 
THE COURT: It's on February 28th at 2:00 o'clock, 
bench trial. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
